Perfecting housing finance by Richard G. Anderson
November 2004 MonetaryTrends




ncreasing the rate of homeownership in the United States
has been an important public policy goal since at least the
1930s. Although the Housing Act of 1949 promised a
decent home for every American, it did not set goals for home
ownership. Yet, many have noted that the intent of the Congress
to promote ownership has been evident in decades of federal
policy. Even before the act, homeownership rates were increasing,
from 44 percent in 1940 to 55 percent in 1950. Since then, the
percentage has increased at a slow, steady pace: to 61.9 percent
in 1960, 63 percent in 1970, 65.6 percent in 1980, and approxi-
mately 68.3 percent of households at year-end 2003.
Perfecting the housing finance system has been an important
part of federal homeownership policy. During the 1920s, thrift
institutions (largely, savings and loan associations, or S&Ls)
made approximately half of the nation’s mortgage loans; these
loans carried a conservative average loan-to-value ratio of 58
percent and, on average, matured in 11 years. The remainder of
mortgage debt largely consisted of unamortized, rollover loans
held by insurance companies and commercial banks, at maturities
ranging from 2 to 4 years. Federal government involvement began
during the 1930s with federal deposit insurance for housing-
focused depository institutions (primarily S&Ls, but also some
savings banks) and with the creation of federal housing agencies
and sponsored enterprises. The latter include the Federal Home
Loan Bank System established in 1932, the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) formed in 1934, the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) chartered in 1938, and the
Farmers Home Administration formed in 1949. In 1968, the
Congress assigned some of Fannie Mae’s functions to the newly
created Government National Mortgage Association and priva-
tized Fannie Mae as a government-sponsored enterprise, or GSE.
By 1970, both Fannie Mae and the newly chartered Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) had broad
powers to operate in the mortgage secondary market.1 More
recently, Farmer Mac joined Fannie and Freddie in 1988. 
The relative importance of these two types of federal involve-
ment has fluctuated through time. Initially, depository institutions
prevailed, as the Federal Home Loan Banks assisted with liq-
uidity and the FHA insured mortgages for lower- and moderate-
income families. When deposit interest rate ceilings pinched
S&Ls during the 1970s, the two GSEs—Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac—provided a conduit between mortgage and capital
markets. Since the late 1980s, however, the role of the GSEs
has expanded. The demise of the S&L industry is well known.
During 1965-82, run-ups in interest rates depleted their capital.
During the 1980s competitive pressures in mortgage markets
so narrowed profit margins that, even with expanded lending
powers, S&Ls could not earn their way back to health. Since
1989, the increase in the share of housing finance handled by
federal agencies and enterprises approximately equals the
decrease in the share held by thrift institutions. At year-end
1983, all federal agencies and sponsored enterprises held or
guaranteed 27 percent of mortgage debt for one-to-four–family
dwellings, while thrift institutions (S&Ls plus credit unions)
and commercial banks, respectively, held 41 percent and 15
percent.2 At year-end 2003, federal agencies and enterprises
held in their portfolios or guaranteed through mortgage-backed
securities 58 percent of mortgages, while thrift institutions and
commercial banks held (directly) approximately 11 percent
and 15 percent of mortgages, respectively.
Some observers have suggested that, because mortgage debt
is large relative to income for most households, federal govern-
ment involvement to mitigate economy-wide nondiversifiable
(systemic) risk is essential for an efficient mortgage finance
system. Such risks may, at times, become expensive for tax-
payers: The combination of government regulation and federal
deposit insurance used to resolve the insolvent S&L industry
15 years ago amounted, essentially, to nationalization of the
industry. Recently, some observers have expressed concern that,
because of their size and the widespread belief that the Congress
would not allow the GSEs to default on their liabilities, inade-
quate regulation could expose taxpayers to uncomfortable risks.
Despite the shift in the focus of federal housing finance from
deposit insurance at S&Ls to conjectural guarantees at the GSEs,
debates over the appropriate extent of federal involvement in
housing finance and the regulation of government-related housing
finance entities is likely to remain a part of federal homeowner-
ship policy well into the future.3
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